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Post-Soviet Integration Breakthrough 
 
Why the Customs Union Has More Chances Than Its Predecessors 
Resume In the medium term, the Common Economic Space will face the dilemma of either 
“enlargement” or “intensification,” which is well known to Europeans. One of the main reasons 
behind the Customs Union’s success is that it has focused on a clear and rather narrow objective.  
The former Soviet republics have signed a great number of agreements, treaties and initiatives 
within a span of two decades since the breakup of the USSR. However, none of the “post-Soviet 
integration” bids proved capable of ensuring real cooperation among the states in the region. The 
fact was fairly obvious to everyone, above all to the states directly involved in the integration 
projects. Against this background, a fundamental change in the situation that occurred in the past 
three years came unexpected to analysts. The Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, launched in 2010, has become the first integration alliance where the partners meet 
their commitments notwithstanding the high costs it involves. The intention to set up a Eurasian 
Economic Union by 2015, announced last November, looks far more realistic than a majority of 
similar past resolutions. What changes have taken place in the post-Soviet space to make such 
projects realistic? Can we expect these initiatives to feature a steady growth? Are the objectives 
ambitious enough to meet the challenges facing the post-Soviet countries? And will their 
implementation help these countries take advantage of the opening economic development 
opportunities? Indeed, missing them would be inexcusable. 
 
ON THE WAY TO REAL INTEGRATION 
Let us first look back at the history of the emergence of the new generation of integration bodies 
in the post-Soviet space. The early 2000s saw the first calls for taking a more pragmatic 
approach to integration and abandoning idealistic rhetoric. Nevertheless, until quite recently the 
post-Soviet states have cooperated in but a few areas to handle issues of the common 
infrastructure created in Soviet times, specifically railways and electric power generation 
facilities. Attempts to breathe new life into existing organizations only worsened the 
contradictions. The two organizations set up in 2006 – the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) 
and the CIS Interstate Humanitarian Cooperation Fund – can be viewed as the first portents of 
change. Unlike the previous initiatives, the objective of the new organizations was to support 
specific projects (banks handling the development of infrastructures and the economy, or 
foundations providing for culture and education projects), not general norms or policy 
coordination. The focus on specific cooperation objectives kept these two bodies from turning 
into new paper-pushing bodies. 
But the genuine breakthrough was paradoxically brought about by the world economic crisis of 
2007-2008. Instead of taking ever tougher protectionist measures (as often happens during global 
upheavals), post-Soviet states opted for establishing more effective cooperation. The 
establishment of the EurAsEc Anti-Crisis Fund in 2009 with a capital of 8.513 billion dollars 
was a landmark decision directly associated with the crisis. The fund has a dual function: first, it 
extends stabilization loans, performing the function of “a regional IMF.” It also compensates for 
balance of payment and budget deficits and supports the national currency. Second, it 
strengthens regional cooperation as a creditor of large investment projects. As of now, the Fund 
has extended loans to Tajikistan and Belarus. Post-Soviet integration has become financially 
attractive, at least for several countries. 
The Customs Union was launched in 2010. It is the most impressive achievement of post-Soviet 
integration at present. Its key features are common duties with respect to third countries and a 
common Customs Code to regulate a majority of trade issues of the member-states. The Customs 
Union uses a proportional voting system, but all its decisions have been consensual up to date. 
The Customs Union members had to introduce major changes to foreign trade regulation. For 
example, Kazakhstan hiked 45 percent and cut 10 percent of customs duties. Aside from 
relations with third countries, the Customs Union has provided more opportunities for interaction 
between the member-states, and not just in trade; in border areas, a number of Russian 
companies consider moving to Kazakhstan’s jurisdiction because of lower taxes there. 
A still greater effect from the liberalization of investment flows is expected from a package of 
agreements on the Common Economic Space (CES), which came into effect on January 1, 2012. 
The CES already has 17 agreements and another 55 are in the works. The agreements spell out 
the freedom of movement of capital and labor, a common policy of competition (including 
natural monopolies, procurements and subsidies), coordination of macroeconomic policy, trade 
in services, technical standards, and access to gas and oil pipelines, energy transmission lines and 
railways. In February 2012, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), a supranational body 
with broad powers, was set up to coordinate the CES. Interestingly, its “lower chamber” – the 
Board – is structured along the lines of the European Commission and comprises officials 
responsible for specific functional integration areas, so they are not merely representatives of 
their countries. Subsequent measures towards establishing a Eurasian Economic Union include a 
single railway cargo tariff starting from 2013, and national regimen of state procurements for all 
companies of the three member-states starting from 2014. 
  
“INTEGRATION FROM BELOW” AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS 
The success of the Customs Union and the CES looks all the more unexpected as it seemingly 
contradicts the logic of the development of the post-Soviet space. Two decades ago, the former 
Soviet republics had far closer economic ties, but their integration (including within the ruble 
zone) was a complete failure. The achievements of post-Soviet integration of the past few years 
may be explained by two circumstances: the growth of real integration “from below” in the 
2000s and the global economic crisis. 
First, it would be incorrect to describe the two decades after the breakup of the USSR solely as a 
period of growing fragmentation. Indeed, many Soviet-era ties were severed, but starting from 
the early 2000s they began to be replaced by new forms of interdependence. The economic 
growth of Russia and Kazakhstan from 1999-2000 whetted the appetites of the emerging 
transnational corporations of these countries, which began vigorously developing the post-Soviet 
space. Russian companies already dominate the mobile phone markets in a majority of CIS states 
and play an important role in many other sectors of CIS economies, while Kazakhstan had been 
leader in investments in the CIS banking sector until 2008. Labor migration is another form of 
new interdependence. Whereas in the 1990s CIS migration flows were largely the immigration 
of ethnic Russians from newly independent states, the past decade has seen an exponential 
growth of temporary migration based on economic factors. As a result, some CIS states have 
posted economic growth on the back of labor migrants’ remittances. In Russia, labor migrants 
account for about 6 percent of the country’s GDP, according to expert estimates. 
Expecting a continuous growth of interdependence between the post-Soviet states would be a big 
oversimplification, though. Regionalization manifests itself in various fields of interaction (for 
example, it is far less expensive in mutual trade) and affects countries unevenly. According the 
EDB Eurasian Development Integration System review, which shows indicators of economic 
interdependence of post-Soviet states in the past decade, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan formed 
the core of integration back in 2004-2005, and integration “from below” has been running at a 
fast rate since then. The establishment of the Customs Union was presumably a logical follow-up 
of the expanding mutual ties within the scope of this core. 
Second, that the Customs Union and the CES emerged in the wake of the global crisis hitting the 
post-Soviet states is more than a coincidence. The logic of regionalism here differs in principle 
from the “classical” pattern. As a rule, the starting floor for integration is the existence of several 
economically separated countries for which integration implies considerable costs, at least in the 
short term. Regional integration requires changes in legislation and adaptation to new standards, 
and is accompanied by increased competition. Unsurprisingly, politicians tend to support 
regional integration during economically safe periods when the costs are less tangible, and are 
reluctant to launch integration projects during crises (the period of stagnation in European 
integration in the 1970s is a graphic example). 
The situation in the post-Soviet space is the exact reverse. The countries have retained 
interdependence inherited from the Soviet era. Therefore, the choice of a disintegration course – 
which requires the development of new branches of industry and a search for new ways of 
integrating in the global system of division of labor – is often more costly. So, in the period of 
crises regional integration appears to be a more preferable option, while in affluent years 
countries can experiment with various options of autarchy or seek new partners. In other words, 
the shock caused by global instability (which dealt a painful blow to Kazakhstan back in 2007, 
and then to Belarus which had to implement a large-scale devaluation of its national currency 
two years later, and then to Russia) brought post-Soviet countries closer together. 
  
PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 
The real situation is certainly not at all cloudless. The Common Economic Space and the 
Customs Union encounter serious problems whose solution will be crucial for their future. In the 
short term, the main difficulties will be technical. The Customs Code norms often contradict 
national legislations, though not critically, and there is no clearly set procedure for enforcing 
these norms. The CES is yet to create mechanisms to implement its basic agreements. Such 
problems are inevitable in implementing large projects, but they may prove fatal if handled by 
inefficient bureaucracy, making integration unattractive for business. In view of this, the 
Customs Union commission has taken a range of important measures to rectify the situation in 
this field. 
The difficulties largely stem from the imbalance of advantages and costs in the CES member-
states. For Kazakhstan and Belarus, the Customs Union implies a considerable increase in import 
duties and, consequently, price hikes and a distorted pattern of trade ties. For Russia, it remains 
unclear, for example, how national phytosanitary standards of the three countries will be 
implemented and monitored within the Customs Union. According to the available studies 
(major assessments of the Customs Union and CES perspectives have been published by the 
World Bank and the EDB Integration Studies Center), these integration bodies can contribute to 
the growth of their members’ economies due to a larger capacity of their domestic markets and 
intensive competition. However, this will be possible under certain conditions, above all if non-
tariff barriers are eliminated. Thus far, the introduction of common technical and phytosanitary 
norms in the Customs Union area has been slow. 
In the medium term, the CES will face the dilemma of either “enlargement” or “intensification,” 
which is well known to Europeans. One of the main reasons behind the Customs Union’s success 
is that, unlike previous regional integration projects with unrealistic ambitious programs, the 
Customs Union has focused on a clear and rather narrow objective. Its membership is far more 
homogenous than in many other regional agreements in the former Soviet Union, and the 
signatories are well-chosen (unlike in other projects). Will the “troika” union be able to go 
beyond its initial agenda? The package of the CES agreements that has come into force shows 
that it can. However, another question arises: Does this rapid process (the transfer within just two 
years from the Customs Union format to the CES notwithstanding unresolved technical 
problems) pose a considerable risk to prospects for more intensive integration? 
Failures may undermine the trust of society and business in the CES, and the governments may 
find themselves unable to keep with the present development rate. However, the peculiarity of 
the post-Soviet space (in contrast to Europe) is that interrelations between countries concerning 
the movement of production factors (capital that is relevant for interaction of the Customs Union 
members, and labor force for interaction between other CIS countries and Customs Union states) 
develop at a faster rate than those in trade. From this point of view, it would be expedient to go 
beyond the Customs Union format, as it only marginally affects interaction in fields where 
“integration from below” is proceeding vigorously. Paradoxically, only a fairly intensive form of 
integration can score a real success in the post-Soviet world (and, perhaps, in other unions of 
developing countries). 
The possibility of the Customs Union’s enlargement is currently being discussed with Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan. Ukraine’s membership in the CES is problematic, despite the “troika’s” best 
efforts (and Russia’s efforts in particular) and close economic ties. Experts estimate that 
Ukraine’s joining the CES, with subsequent technological rapprochement, will secure a 6-
percent increase of its GDP in the long term (according to the findings of the EDB’s joint study 
with the Institute of Economic Forecasting under the Russian Academy of Sciences and the 
Economic Policy Institute, NANU). But political factors interfering with integration are too 
strong. Even Ukraine’s becoming an EDB shareholder – a neutral issue which does not involve 
crucial decisions – has been stalled despite obvious advantages for Kiev. 
As for Kyrgyzstan, its ascension to the CES and the Customs Union is quite possible, 
considering the country’s vulnerable economic position. In the recent years, the Kyrgyz 
economy has been growing mainly due to its role as a transshipment point for re-export of 
Chinese consumer goods to CIS and Central Asian countries, made possible by a very liberal 
foreign-trade regime. Having found itself outside of the boundaries of the Customs Union, 
Bishkek can no longer play this role because of stronger customs barriers on the border with 
Kazakhstan. By joining the Customs Union, Kyrgyzstan will have to toughen its foreign trade 
regime, which will partially close “the window” for trade with China. Analyses by the EDB 
Integration Studies center and Kyrgyzstan’s National Institute of Strategic Studies show that the 
pros of joining the Customs Union outweigh the cons. Kyrgyzstan’s WTO membership is 
another problem: the country will have to hike tariffs if it joins the Customs Union, in some 
cases to a level that would contradict WTO rules, which will require negotiations within the 
WTO framework. Of course, the expected WTO membership of Russia and Kazakhstan will 
make the solution of the problem easier. 
In the long term, the development of integration in the post-Soviet space may be held back by 
factors which the Eurasian Economic Union will have to face sooner or later. This is, first of all, 
the prevalence of the resource sector in the economies of two of the three CES states, which 
diminishes the integration effect. Moreover, the key oil and gas sectors of Russia and 
Kazakhstan are oriented towards foreign markets. Deeper integration requires diversifying the 
economy and reducing its dependence on raw materials, a task whose successful solution can 
hardly be found in international practice. Second, the progress of post-Soviet integration also 
depends on successful modernization of institutions and societies in the post-Soviet countries, 
which is yet another difficult task. 
  
FROM POST-SOVIET TO EURASIAN INTEGRATION 
There are problems not only in interaction among post-Soviet countries but also in their relations 
with the rest of the world. For many of them, including Russia, the EU is a more important trade 
partner than their immediate neighbors. The recent years have seen a growing role of China as a 
source of investments and loans in Central Asia, as well as in Belarus and Ukraine. International 
actors and analysts alike seem to share the view that the post-Soviet and European integration 
vectors are incompatible in principle, and that Post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe, in 
particular Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, should decide once and for all where their loyalties lie. 
This is hardly a true-to-fact view, yet it prevails at present and has a very negative influence on 
integration dynamics in northern Eurasia. Therefore, it is important to underscore once again that 
integration projects can fully realize their potential in the post-Soviet space if implemented as 
part of a broader, transcontinental integration involving external players. 
In the first place, it concerns infrastructure networks. The geographic position of post-Soviet 
states between Europe and Asia enables the CIS states to derive considerable benefit from their 
transport potential – but only if it is linked with cross-border transport projects implemented in 
other parts of Eurasia, for example, by the European Union or the Asian Development Bank. 
In the electric power sphere, the common market of the former Soviet Union, mostly inherited 
from the USSR unified energy systems, would be more effective if it were linked to the energy 
markets of other countries, such as the EU, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. In the 
same manner, there are advantages of open borders with external players in trade and 
investments where such “open regionalism” helps avoid conflicts between integration projects. 
In general, new integration projects do not have to be confined to the borders of the former 
USSR; on the contrary, it is quite natural to look for new partners outside of these borders, 
especially in Europe and East Asia. 
Ways to organize interaction with external players differ in the east and the west of the post-
Soviet space. In the west, priority may be given to structuring the Eurasian Economic Union in 
such a way that participation in it would be combined with cooperation with the EU. It may 
involve, for example, harmonization of the parties’ standards and technical and phytosanitary 
norms. Of course, it cannot be accomplished by a single-step decision, as harmonization requires 
considerable costs, yet the best option would be to look for solutions compatible with European 
ones. In trade, cooperation suggests the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area (DCFTA) between the Customs Union and the EU, which would provide for the solution of 
issues of trade proper, as well as of uniform standards, protection of investments, migration and 
the visa regime. Such a scenario can and should be discussed, even if it seems hard to implement 
at present. In the conditions of the EU unification crisis, the EU may become more autarkic, and 
it will take time to resolve its fiscal integration problems. 
In Asia, the situation seems somewhat simpler: the integration is more flexible there and it 
involves a limited range of issues. Consequently, there is no competition between integration 
initiatives, while interaction with the post-Soviet integration group involves fewer institutional 
difficulties. Yet there exist quite a few problems there as well. 
First, it is important to avoid post-Soviet agreements turning into huge structures comprising too 
many incompatible players. It would be useful to analyze the negative experience of APEC 
falling victim to its own success: consistent use of the open regionalism principle increased the 
organization’s membership and heterogeneity, and eventually reduced its capability. Secondly, 
the deficit of trust is present in Asia, too: China, for example, causes serious apprehensions in the 
elites and populations of post-Soviet countries (although these fears are caused by myths rather 
than real risks). Ideally, interaction between the Eurasian Economic Union and Asian countries 
could lean on a range of complex bilateral free trade areas (preferably backed by additional 
agreements on visa-free movement and labor migration), as well as on “functional” projects to 
effectively pool transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructures.  
* * * 
Within a span of several years, post-Soviet integration has evolved from a largely paper project 
and rhetoric construct – which certain countries exploited to suit their domestic policies – into an 
important factor influencing economic development. However, its further prospects are unclear. 
On the one hand, it is the current format of a small group of countries with a clear objective 
(trade and economic rapprochement) that made the Customs Union a success. On the other hand, 
a truly big success can only be achieved by crossing the present-day borders – both geographic 
(for example, by stepping up interaction with China and the European Union) and functional – 
by handling the movement of production factors, ensuring uniform rules of the game (technical 
regulation, and access to monopolies’ services) and guaranteeing the coordination of 
macroeconomic policy. Finally, post-Soviet regionalism is by no means an alternative to global 
integration, for example within the framework of the World Trade Organization (as is sometimes 
claimed). The advantages of WTO membership for the CES states are considerable, so the 
regional project should be viewed as a process parallel to global economic integration. 
 
